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µ1LFH DSDUWPHQWV QR MREV¶ KRZ IRUPHU YLOODJHUV H[SHULHQFHG GLVSODFHPHQW DQG
resettlement in the western suburbs of Shanghai 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we document the displacement and resettlement of over 11,000 villagers who 
were removed from their homes and relocated in modern apartment blocks to make way for 
the construction of a new business district in the western suburbs of Shanghai. We examine 
the expectations and concerns of displaced residents before and after their relocation. Our 
findings showed that while the former villagers recognized the improvement in their physical 
surroundings, they were deeply concerned about their loss of rental income resulting from the 
demolition of their former homes, in which they housed unregistered migrants. They felt 
unfairly treated by government throughout the relocation process and saw themselves as 
being decanted into a new village-in-the-city. These results paint a much more unequivocal 
picture of resident dissatisfaction than is found in some other recent research.  
 
 
Introduction: mega projects and displacement in Shanghai   
 
Mass displacement and resettlement have for some time now been an all-pervasive feature 
of social transformation in China. In this paper, we examine the case of over 11,000 people 
who were in effect forced to move from their villages into purposely built apartment blocks in 
order to make way for a huge commercial project in Shanghai. We undertook an extensive 
survey of residents, asking them to compare their lives before and after resettlement and to 
comment on the compensation process. Our principal finding is that, despite a new living 
environment which a majority of the displaced villagers acknowledged to be better than the 
one they left, the removal of a reliable source of income in the form of rent and a scarcity of 
suitable jobs has made them more vulnerable. They lamented the irony of a situation that 
made them feel they were trapped in a new environment that was supposed to enfranchise 
them in the city. The overwhelming sentiment they expressed was that they felt like second-
FODVVFLWL]HQVLQDQHZµYLOODJH-in-the-FLW\¶VWULSSHGRIWKHLUOLYHOLKRRG 
 
This paper feeds into debates on the outcomes of resettlement for displaced villagers in rapidly 
changing suburban Shanghai and more broadly therefore contributes to our understanding of 
the process and impact of feverish state-propelled urbanization on local people. Our research 
looks specifically at the relationship between house and job, a relationship that has been 
under-reported elsewhere. It reveals the pivotal importance for displaced former villagers of 
the rental income they were once able to accrue by renting out extra-legally constructed 
accommodation space to unregistered migrants. In so doing, it points to some of the issues 
thrown up by the institutional arrangements that control ownership of land and movement of 
people in China. Indeed, we present here an uncompromising picture: resettled villagers were 
dissatisfied with their compensation and with their new situation even as they appreciated the 
modern environment in which they found themselves. Their source of income was removed, 
and there was no proper programme of jobs and training to replace it. Officials, on the other 
hand, felt it sufficient to enable them to purchase additional apartments at subsidized rates, 
but the former villagers themselves could not rent or sell their new apartments because 
incoming residents were able to find and afford better elsewhere. Their overall reaction was 
negative: without income there is no security. This places our research at odds with the results 
of a number of Shanghai-based surveys which, while differing in some elements of their 
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approach, have painted a more mitigated picture or drawn attention to the reported benefits of 
displacement and resettlement programmes. 
 
Hongqiao, the new commercial hub where our research is set, lies in the west of Shanghai 
and is one of the largest urban construction projects that China has yet seen. The project has 
two components. The first is a transport hub, including a new terminus station for high-speed 
trains linking to the existing airport, which itself has been expanded. This was completed in 
DQGKDVDOUHDG\EHFRPHWKHFLW\¶VPDLQSRLQWRIFRQQHFWLRQWRWKHVXUURXQGLQJ<DQJW]H
River Delta with passenger flows of 182 million in 2011, its first full year of operation. The 
second is a business district designed to counterbalance Pudong on which work began in 
2009. The project is a huge national undertaking that has affected a large number of local 
residents, migrants and owners and employees of small and medium-sized factories and 
companies, all of whom have been forced to make way for the project. The Hongqiao project 
involved the acquisition of 17.7 square kilometres and the demolition of 11 villages made up 
of 76 smaller communities, involving over 11,000 registered residents, 4000 households and 
over 1700 enterprises (in addition to an unknown number of unregistered migrants, likely to 
be half as much again). This represented a new demolition and relocation record for 
Shanghai.1  
 
As for the displaced villagers, their future lives hinged to a large extent on the amount of 
compensation they would receive. It is not surprising, therefore, that they harboured both deep 
fears and high expectations for the relocation. Meanwhile, local government tried to find ways 
to reduce the cost of relocation and resettlement of residents. Because funding for relocation 
was fixed and compensation was deducted from the budget for the whole project, the amount 
of compensation payments directly determined the funds available for the project thereby 
affecting its progress.  
 
After a brief review of the underlying institutional factors that shape the social geography of 
urban China, this paper continues with a review of the issues raised and conclusions drawn 
by other surveys of urban displacement and resettlement projects in and around Shanghai. 
The empirical heart of the paper reports on the results of our investigations in three stages. 
)LUVW ZH SUHVHQW YLOODJHUV¶ reflections on their former lives and livelihoods. Secondly, we 
provide a brief summary of some of the problems related to compensation and the relocation 
process. Finally, we appraise the effect of resettlement on the lives of the resettled residents, 
relating their feelings on the extent and nature of the impact of the Hongqiao project on their 
ability to make a living. The paper concludes by highlighting their dissatisfaction both with the 
compensation they received and with the lack of a steady source of income in their new 
surroundings.   
 
 
Placing Hongqiao in a broader context of displacement and resettlement 
 
The household registration (hukou) system in China registers people as either urban or rural, 
while land is defined as rural, in which case it iVµRZQHG¶E\FROOHFWLYHHQWLWLHVRUXUEDQZKHUH
LW LV µRZQHG¶ E\ WKH VWDWH 7KHVH ERXQGDULHV DUH ULGGOHG ZLWK DQRPDOLHV WKDW KDYH OHG WR
manifold states of exception, as in the case we examine here, where villagers needed 
                                                 
1
 Interview with local government officials, 4 August 2012. 
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compensation for income from unregistered migrants living in extra-legal dwellings. Similarly, 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRQYHQWLRQDOFDOFXODWLRQWKDWFRQYHUWLQJUXUDOODQGWRXUEDQZKLOHµUHZDUGLQJ¶
rural hukou holders with urban status goes some way to appeasing displaced villagers no 
longer satisfies everyone as they lose the entitlement to land that comes with the rural hukou 
and gain little in its place (Smith, 2014; Andreas and Zhan, 2016; Hsing, 2010; Chuang, 2015). 
 
The issues are particularly acute at the urban edge. Here in most cases the state expropriates 
the massive increase in the value of land realized through subsequent land and property 
transactions (Wu and Waley, 2017). After compensation and relocation, relocated villagers 
face a series of problems, often depending on the type of displacement. These can be related 
to a lack of job opportunities, to a lost sense of belonging, to poor social integration and to the 
onset of material poverty (Ye, 2008; He, 2013; Dong and Wang, 2014). Despite the uniformity 
of the fact of expropriation, its consequences in the form of displacement and resettlement are 
variable, depending both on the degree of urban-ness and on location within China. In some 
locations and in particular circumstances, residents are able to capture at least some of the 
rent gap through the creation of shareholding companies, sometimes known as cooperatives, 
by means of which residents reap dividends from profits made through the leasing of parcels 
RQFROOHFWLYHYLOODJHODQG7KLV³GLVWULEXWLRQRIUHQWV´+VLQJLVDIDLUO\ZLGHVSUHDG
practice in the Pearl River Delta but is occasionally found elsewhere too (Zhu and Yan, 2014; 
Po, 2011), although even in these circumstances, the benefits are unlikely to be evenly 
distributed (He et al., 2009). It is important to recognize, however, that the situation in 
6KDQJKDLGLIIHUVVLJQLILFDQWO\IURPWKH3HDUO5LYHU'HOWD6KDQJKDL¶VXUEDQYLOODJHVRUYLOODJHV-
in-the-city, as they are known in Chinese) have worse housing conditions than equivalent 
spaces in Guangzhou or indeed Beijing (Li and Wu, 2013; Wu, 2016a; Wu, 2016b).  
 
An important consideration affecting the outcome of displacement and relocation for urban 
villagers is the nature of the project involved. Where this is a commercial development, as has 
been the case with projects on the urban fringes of Hangzhou and Zhengzhou, villagers often 
find it easier to bargain with private property developers and strike highly favourable deals as 
an outcome (Li et al., 2010; Wang and Feng, 2012). However, when it comes to state-led 
projects, displaced villagers have less chance to bargain with local government. Because 
Hongqiao transport hub was a national key transport project, this affected the whole Hongqiao 
development and meant that villagers had much less latitude for negotiation.2  
 
$OWKRXJK+RQJTLDRLVQRORQJHURQ6KDQJKDL¶VXUEDQIULQJHWKHLVVXHVLWWKURZVXSVSHDNWR
a growing literature on the impact of displacement and resettlement in Shanghai and the 
Yangtze River Delta. Research on displacement and resettlement in this part of China 
presents a conflicting picture of how residents contrast their life before and after resettlement. 
The paragraphs that follow elaborate on this conflicting picture from a number of different 
standpoints: compensation, sources of income, social networks, life satisfaction and the 
EDODQFHVKHHWTXHVWLRQRIZLQQHUVDQGORVHUV*LYHQWKH³YDVWERG\RIOLWHUDWXUHRQUHVLGHQWLDO
PRELOLW\´:XDQGHYen more so on displacement and resettlement more generally, 
the focus in the brief summary that follows will be on work that examines Shanghai, with 
occasional references further afield.  
 
                                                 
2
 A State Council decree promulgated in 2011 has improved compensation standards somewhat. 
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Compensation for forced relocation may take one or more of several different forms: 
compensation in money, in kind or in shares or other stakes in the project (Lian et al., 2016). 
Most scholars, however, report findings that convey widespread dissatisfaction among those 
displaced as a result of a lack of advance information (Siciliano, 2014). A second, related 
complaint is of an unfair compensation process lacking in transparency (Siciliano, 2014). At 
best, the results of the process tend to be seen as uneven, as those who insist on negotiating 
UDWKHU WKDQDFFHSWLQJ WKHDXWKRULWLHV¶ WHUPVFDQZULQJ IRU WKHPVHOYHVEHWWHUFRPSHQVDWLRQ
deals (Wang et al., 2017). Most fundamentally, compensation is seen as insufficient, 
especially in view of the massive profits made by local governments from the leasing of 
developed land (Ong, 2014). 
 
Other research presents a similar, indeed more clear-cut picture. For example, Chen 
<LQJIDQJ¶VZRUNRQGLVSODFHGIDUPHUVRQWKHXUEDQHGJHRI6KDQJKDLUHYHDOVWKDWWKH
farmers believed they had been insufficiently compensated for lost land and home, that their 
rights were not being protected, that the expropriation process was unfairly implemented, and 
that they failed to receive social security benefits commensurate with those of urban workers 
(Chen, et al., 2003). Similar findings issue from the work of Mao and Wang (2006). In their 
survey, land-lost farmers in the periphery of a city in Zhejiang province expressed fears over 
lost security as a result of the expropriation of their land and their lack of qualifications for the 
urban labour market. The consequent loss of self-confidence and self-esteem is highlighted 
in research by Zhang and Tong (2006).  
 
A prominent complaint of relocated farmers concerns the loss of the fields that secured them 
an income (albeit often a small one) and some food for their kitchens (Ong, 2014). This leads 
to problems of food security faced after resettlement, especially for the elderly, confronted with 
the possibility of not being able to buy enough food to live off (Lian et al., 2016; Siciliano, 2014). 
Many so-called land-lost farmers continue some farming activities as best they can despite 
living in high-rise apartment blocks (Li et al., 2016). Others work to re-create the type of 
informal landscape they had known previously and which enabled them to earn money (Zhao 
and Zou, 2017). 
 
$QXPEHURIVWXGLHVKDYHH[DPLQHGWKHLPSDFWRIUHVHWWOHPHQWRQSHRSOH¶VVRFLDOQHWZRUNV
Here too, the results are contradictory. Some findings point to negative consequences, 
especially for forced movers (Huang et al., 2016; Lin, 2015). Others argue that there is actually 
a differentiating effect whereby the better-off amongst the displaced are able to broaden their 
social networks in their new accommodation, while for poorer residents the contrary effect 
holds true (Zhang et al., 2017). Still others paint a recognizable picture -- a diminution of family 
and kinship ties and an accentuation of broader, associational networks -- but with an 
interesting context-specific twist, that one main point of social networking shifts from the home 
to the compound gate (Xu et al., 2016). The overall picture these scholars draw is a complex 
and mixed one that does not allow for easy generalization.  
 
It is certainly not the case that all studies report findings of dissatisfaction and unhappiness 
among those who have been displaced and resettled. Surprisingly perhaps, many studies 
present a more favourable picture. Zhang et al. (2017) report that about half their respondents 
in a newly created Shanghai urban resettlement district consisting of apartment blocks are 
VDWLVILHGZLWK³EHFRPLQJXUEDQ´SEXWWKH\KDYHOHVVWRVD\RQWKHFKDQJHGFDSDFLW\RI
UHVLGHQWVWRPDNHDOLYLQJZLWKRXWLQFRPHIURPIDUPLQJ7LDQDQGFROOHDJXHV¶ (2017) findings 
5 
 
indicate that residents were overwhelmingly well-disposed towards a move into apartments 
as their houses were old and they had not been allowed to upgrade them by Shanghai City 
Government, a view echoed in the work of Wu (2016a). 
 
Two substantial surveys support these points and additionally suggest that there is not a 
significant difference between so-FDOOHGYROXQWDU\RUµFKRLFH¶PRYHUVDQGWKRVHZKRKDGQR
FKRLFHZLWKWKHODWWHUJURXSVKRZLQJDVRPHZKDWUHGXFHGOHYHORIVDWLVIDFWLRQ:X¶s research, 
published in 2004, of over 400 households in Shanghai paints a relatively favourable picture 
of resettlement outcomes with higher rates of satisfaction than of dissatisfaction for nearly all 
housing types and among both voluntary and involuntary movers. These findings are 
supported in an extensive survey of inner Shanghai by Li and Song (2009), who surmise that 
this unexpectedly favourable picture, both among voluntary and involuntary movers, might be 
occasioned by the crowded nature of old housing in Shanghai and higher compensation levels 
PDGHSRVVLEOHE\6KDQJKDL¶VJUHDWHUZHDOWKUHODWLYHWRRWKHU&KLQHVHFLWLHV'D\¶VUHVHDUFK
(2013), conducted at four separate locations in outer Shanghai, surveyed the views of 900 
voluntary and involuntary movers from inner parts of the city. It is rather more inconclusive in 
its findings, and while Day finds more evidence of negative impacts, particularly among 
involuntarily relocated residents, on balance her findings indicate higher levels of satisfaction 
than of dissatisfaction.  
 
Drawing conclusions from this literature based largely on Shanghai and the Yangtze River 
Delta is difficult. What we can safely say, however, is that lurking behind these studies and 
their findings is an unresolved conflict between livelihood and environment. Thus, some 
displaced and resettled residents appear to value their new immediate surroundings (Wu 2004; 
Li and Song, 2009) while others lament their lost economic security (Chen, 2003; Siciliano, 
2014). At the same time, it is important to note that few of these studies interrogate the issue 
of lost rental income, and none of them are concerned explicitly with the contradiction between 
a new environment for everyday life and a loss of income and security. Our investigation is 
constructed specifically to capture the tension that exists for resettled residents between new 
environment and livelihood sustainability. It hinges on the ambivalence of the institutional dual 
land system, as a result of which villagers could raise their incomes substantially through 
renting out to migrants but are unable to replace this income after resettlement.  
 
 
Conducting interviews and surveys in a zone in transition 
 
The data for this research is based on three fieldwork stints in Shanghai in 2011, 2012 and 
2013 and a number of subsequent visits, the last of them in November 2016. The fieldwork 
itself took place in two different stages. The first stage was between November 2011 and 
February 2012; the second took place between June 2012 and August 2012. During the 
second stage, an extensive questionnaire survey was administered in person at apartments 
numbered 202 and 402 in each apartment block (and 301 and 501 as alternatives where these 
were empty). The apartment blocks were strategically selected to capture people from each 
of the villages whose inhabitants were moved into the new purpose-built settlement. The 
survey was undertaken by students of East China Normal University. In the survey a total of 
350 questionnaires were distributed. To maximise the response rate, questionnaires were 
hand delivered, filled in through face-to-face interviews, and subsequently cross-checked to 
ensure that each participant responded only once. This helped obtain a very high response 
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rate, with 344 out of 350 questionnaires collected. There was a moderate bias towards men 
among our respondents (61%). This can be attributed primarily, we believe, to the prominent 
role played by male household heads in handling relocation and compensation issues as part 
of patriarchal family structures. Respondents were of all ages, but with a bias towards the 
older age groups (15% under 40, 42.5% under 60 and the same percentage over 60). The 
lower rate of respondents who were younger than 40 reflects the loss of young people from 
the resettlement community.  
 
The overall aim was to obtain enough data to have a thorough understanding of how the lives 
of the land-lost farmers had changed and what they thought of their current circumstances. To 
this end, in the questionnaire survey participants were asked a series of detailed questions 
about their life before relocation, about the compensation they received and the process of 
UHORFDWLRQ DQG WKHLU FXUUHQW VLWXDWLRQ SRVW UHORFDWLRQ 7KH IRFXV ZDV RQ WKH SDUWLFLSDQWV¶
environment for daily life and their income. Where appropriate, survey questions allowed for 
multiple unweighted answers. As part of the first two stages of the research, 30 villagers were 
interviewed individually for periods of between one and two hours, during which time they were 
encouraged to talk more freely in response to structured questions on life before and after 
resettlement and on the compensation they received. A further ten were interviewed during a 
subsequent visit in 2015 in order to be able to ask questions about their more recent 
experiences in terms of income and employment. 
 
Numerous and in-depth interviews were conducted between 2011 and 2016 with government 
officials, planners, scholars, administrators from state-owned companies, village leaders and 
real estate developers, in addition, that is, to interviews with villagers that formed the primary 
part of the fieldwork. Where these interviews are mentioned here, names are concealed to 
protect the identity of our interlocutors.  
 
 
Life before displacement  
 
We start our investigation into the forced move of villagers to make way for the Hongqiao 
project by examining their accounts of the ways they lived and earned a livelihood before their 
move. This, in other words, is an account of life before displacement. We look here primarily 
DWWKHHQYLURQPHQWIRUWKHYLOODJHUV¶HYHU\GD\OLIHWKHLUOLYLQJFRQGLWLRQVDQGWKHLULQFRPH$OO
those registered residents who were displaced by the Hongqiao project came from Minhang 
District, and most of them from Huacao Township, a lower tier administrative territory within 
the district. They were all compensated and resettled in a purpose-built settlement, a move 
that was initiated in July 2009.  
 
Before the development of the Hongqiao project, Minhang District in the west of Shanghai had 
been peripheral to the economic development of the city; it was an area with a low rate of 
urbanization, classified as rural, meaning that the land was formally owned by village 
FRPPLWWHHVXQOLNHWKHODQGLQ6KDQJKDL¶VFHQWUDOGLVWULFWVZKLFK has always been classified 
as urban and owned by the state. Huacao, as one of 12 townships within the jurisdiction of 
Minhang District, was semi-rural and semi-urban, characterized by a mix of a large number of 
small-sized private and collectively owned factories, farmland and scattered settlements. The 
overwhelming majority (94%) of residents surveyed held rural hukou, but they were given 
urban hukou after relocation. The relative under-urbanization of this area can be explained by 
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the presence of Hongqiao Airport, which restricted the urbanization of the surrounding area 
due to a height limit on buildings, noise pollution and poor transportation around the airport. 
As a result of these unfavourable circumstances, investment from public and private sectors 
and preferential government policies at various levels did not reach this relatively isolated area 
in the wave of construction and development in Shanghai in the years since 1980.3  
 
A number of big factories had originally been relocated to Hongqiao as a result of inner-city 
regeneration in Shanghai around the year 2000, when most manufacturing plants were moved 
from the city centre to the urban outskirts. In this way, Hongqiao gradually became a 
resettlement site for small and medium enterprises. Local rural land was rented out by village 
committees for the construction of factory buildings, while other plots were kept by local 
villagers for vegetable farming. Their land, whether used for farming or rented out via the 
village committee to factories, boosted the income of local villagers. With the increasing 
number of factories moving to Hongqiao, Huacao Township can be considered to have been 
a typical Shanghai village-in-the-city. 
 
The surroundings that existed in Huacao Township are widely characterized as an unplanned 
environment with a high population density, poor education and healthcare facilities, narrow 
roads and scarce public space (Sargeson, 2013).4 On the other hand, villagers had relatively 
generous living space. According to our survey, over 50% of respondents had houses with 
more than two storeys, and over 30% with more than three storeys. Their own quarters were 
large, some of them very large; 77% of interviewees had a total floor space of more than 200 
square metres, larger than the size of an average Shanghai family house.  
 
The principal feature of these villages was their densification due to the building of extra-legal 
KRXVLQJLQWKHFRPSRXQGVRIYLOODJHUV¶UHVLGHQFHVIRUWKHDFFRPPRGDWLRQRIPLJUDQWZRUNHUV
attracted by the presence of factories (Chung, 2010; Wu, 2016a). The increasing number of 
factories in Huacao Township provoked an influx of migrant workers attracted by new job 
opportunities, and demand for rooms to rent increased dramatically. 5 The lack of planning or 
response from the local state in terms of housing provision created a vacuum that was 
gradually filled by local villagers, who started to build or expand housing on their own farmland 
without land-use planning and government permission. This was confirmed by our 
interviewees, with almost 90% of villagers relating that they had built extra housing for rent by 
the time of relocation. This additional living space became crucial in generating income to 
VXSSRUWWKHYLOODJHUV¶OLYLQJFRVWVEXWWKHIDFWWKDWWKHVHZHUHFRQVLGHUHGLOOHJDOVWUXFWXUHVE\
Minhang District Government (MDG) caused repeated difficulties in the process of relocation 
in terms of compensation. The µLOOHJDO¶QDWXUHRIWKLVKRXVLQJZDVXVHGDVDWRROE\WKHGLVWULFW
JRYHUQPHQWWRFRHUFHYLOODJHUV LQWRPRYLQJ)LQDOO\DOPRVWDOO WKH µLOOHJDO¶ OLYLQJVSDFHZDV
compensated at half the price of legal buildings.6  
 
Villagers who lived in Huacao Township, by virtue of their location within Shanghai, not only 
enjoyed some of the benefits of urban residents, including pension and health insurance, but 
                                                 
3
 Interviews with Shanghai Municipal Government officials, 21 July and 3 August 2012. 
4
 This sort of negative attitude, relayed to us by an official from MDG in an interview (29 July 2012), 
was, and remains, common among government officials. 
5
 Interview with Shanghai Municipal Government official, 21 July 2012. 
6
 Interview with an official from MDG, 8 August 2012. 
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also benefited from their status as villagers through municipal subsidies for agricultural 
production as well as rent from migrant workers and dividends from factories.7 All this led to a 
dramatic boost in income for many villagers. Our survey revealed that 21% of households had 
monthly incomes exceeding 50,000 RMB, while some villagers had monthly incomes from 
rental activity exceeding 100,000 RMB, a very substantial sum of money.8 
 
Based on the evidence we received from interviews and our survey, we can safely conclude 
that former villagers led a prosperous life but in overcrowded and even unhygienic living 
condLWLRQV7KHIRUPHUYLOODJHUV¶OLYLQJVWDQGDUGVZHUHKHDYLO\UHOLDQWRQUHQWLQJRXWKRXVLQJ
to migrant workers, land dividends received from the village committee for rented factory land 
and job opportunities in the small factories located around the villages. This combination of 
income from renting properties to migrant workers while undertaking subsistence farming to 
SURYLGH WKHLUEDVLFIRRGUHTXLUHPHQWV LVFRPPRQ LQRWKHUXUEDQLVLQJDUHDVDURXQG&KLQD¶V
cities (Webber, 2008). It can be well imagined that former villagers were reluctant to move 
when they had become accustomed to this way of life, and they were in a vulnerable position 
when it came to facing compulsory relocation. In the following section we look at the 
complexities of the compensation arrangements and the dissatisfaction they occasioned. 
 
 
The vexed issue of compensation 
 
The villagers in theory could choose between 100% monetary compensation and 
compensation in kind, in the form of a compensation package including some additional 
financial compensation. But they were specifically discouraged from choosing monetary 
compensation by MDG, whose officials were concerned that the villagers might squander their 
compensation and become a burden on government. As a result, only about 12 out of 4000 
households chose monetary compensation, which excluded the possibility of buying 
apartments at discounted rates. The others all received a compensation  package the size of 
which depended on a calculation of lost land-use rights, crops and built assets (house and 
surrounding compound) together with the bonus for early acceptance. The level of 
compensation for land was separate from the compensation for lost housing and was 
determined by factors such as location and quality of the land. Since the area was classified 
as rural, the compensation standards relating to rural land were applied, lower than those for 
urban land. Villagers received 30,000 RMB per mu (one-fifteenth of a hectare), far less than 
the market value and far less, they noted, than inner city dwellers relocated to the suburbs.  
 
Compensation in kind consisted of two components: monetary compensation totalling 
between 0.9 and 1.1 million RMB to cover interim relocation costs and a package that enabled 
them to buy up to 260 square metres of resettlement housing at a special subsidised rate, the 
precise size depending on the extent of their original dwelling and family size. All of this was 
to come out of a specially opened bank account which was to be exclusively used for 
resettlement purposes (Hsing, 2010: 109). About 90% of the villagers bought three apartments, 
paying at market price where these apartments exceeded the quota of floor area. In other 
words, the relocation system was heavily geared towards encouraging them to buy additional 
apartments, with the aim of helping them benefit from rising property values; our interviewees, 
                                                 
7
 Interviews with MDG officials, 1 December 2011 and 29 July 2012.  
8
 10 RMB are worth about £1.20 or $1.50 (November 2016).  
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on the other hand, told us they were disinclined to lose potential rent by selling up even if they 
could find buyers.9  
 
The relocation process had to be complete in time for the opening of Shanghai Expo on 1 May 
2010. Local government used the fact that the transport hub was a national key project to 
persuade villagers to make a sacrifice for the sake of national goals ± no mention was made 
of Hongqiao Business District.10 2IILFLDOVDWWHPSWHGWRDVVXDJHYLOODJHUV¶IHDUVE\HPSKDVL]LQJ
that they would be moved to a nearby location. Nevertheless, compensation negotiations 
proceeded with difficulty. Villagers were confused by the evaluation forms, even after they had 
received explanations, and they were unsure how many apartments they would receive. They 
were particularly concerned by issues of transparency and fairness; they tried to compare the 
compensation payments they received with those of their neighbours (Lian et al, 2016; Chen, 
2003). In particular, they criticized village leaders, who were also relocatees, for getting a 
greater number of apartments through resettlement. Eventually, government officials won over 
all but a handful of villagers by promising relocation subsidies and rewards amounting to RMB 
150,000. However, problems persisted: over 60% of the villagers we interviewed claimed that 
once they had paid for temporary accommodation, the relocation process and the decorating 
and furnishing of new housing, there was little money left over from their compensation 
package. 
 
 
After resettlement: the new Aibo Community 
 
After signing contracts for compensation and relocation, because resettlement housing in Aibo 
Community was at least three years off completion, all villagers were and told to find temporary 
accommodation in the open market or share with relatives. The elderly were given state 
accommodation provided by MDG.11 Once the housing was complete, villagers and their 
IDPLOLHVµUHWXUQHG¶WRDSODFHWKDWZDVDFWXDOO\FORVHWRZKHUHWKH\KDGEHHQOLYLQJSUHYLRXVO\
but without land and a source of income -- and in a completely different environment (see Li 
et al., 2014, for a similar case in Guangzhou). They were, as we found in our interviews, well 
aware of the irony of their situation: 
 
³:HDUHVXUURXQGHGE\OX[XU\SURSHUWLHVDQGRIILFHWRZHUV2XU$LER&RPPXQLW\KDV
become a new village-in-the-city. We have been transformed from an old village-in-
the-city into a new village-in-the-FLW\,W¶VDMRNH%XWZHKDYHORVWRXUODQGZKLFKZDV
oXUVHFXULW\DQGRXU OLYHOLKRRG ,W¶VYHU\XQIDLU -- local government expropriated the 
land from us with very little compensation but in no time is selling it at about 20 million 
yuan per mu. You see how much profit they are making? What do we get from land 
H[SURSULDWLRQ"´12 
 
The relocatees were settled in five villages of the new Aibo Community numbered Aibo Village 
1 to 5. Aibo Community is a newly built modern residential settlement located in the north-
west corner of Hongqiao business district. There are more than 100 13-storey buildings in the 
                                                 
9
 Interviews with relocated villagers, 20 September 2015. 
10
 Interviews with local villagers, 28 July 2012.  
11
 Interviews with relocated villagers, 28 July 2012. 
12
 Interview with relocated villager, 25 August 2015.  
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ILYHµYLOODJHV¶RI$LER&RPPXQLW\ZLWKPRVWUHORFDWHHVKRXVHGFORVHWRRWKHUVIURPWKHVDPH
village. Over 80% of relocated villagers admitted that their living environment had improved 
compared to what it had been, and they were satisfied with their new apartments.  
 
The first stage of Aibo Community was built to house the relocatees. Many villagers started 
attempting to sell or rent their secondary dwellings on the open market. This was formalized 
when a second stage was started in 2013 to attract new urban residents with higher incomes 
and educational backgrounds to create a mixed community.13 Companies such as China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation and Wanke Property had been moving into the Hongqiao 
Business District, and some of their younger employees rented apartments in Aibo Community. 
But as their number grew, employees of these large companies predominantly took to buying 
apartments in the numerous gated compounds built around the Aibo Community, meaning 
thaWPDQ\RIWKHUHORFDWHHV¶PXOWLSOHDSDUWPHQWVVWRRGHPSW\14 There was indeed a glut of 
up-market homes constructed in and around Hongqiao at the time Aibo was being built, and 
incoming middle-class company employees were not favourably disposed towards renting or 
buying an apartment in a settlement for relocated villagers. What is more, the formal nature of 
the Aibo apartments and the concomitantly high rent put them well beyond the means of 
migrant workers. 
 
Aibo Community is equipped with various facilities which are normally only to be found in 
urban gated communities. Fitness facilities and green spaces have been provided by local 
government, and an activity centre was built for relocatees for weddings and other ceremonies. 
These and other facilities were also designed to attract other, non-relocatee residents to Aibo 
Community. A new good-quality public high school affiliated to Shanghai Foreign Language 
University was established in Aibo Community, greatly improving the quality of educational 
provision in the area. Due to a relatively high proportion of elderly people, a nursing home was 
built to cater for senior citizens, as well as a market and some hotels. In terms of transportation, 
a bus service linking Aibo to Shanghai city centre and other townships of Minhang District was 
established, and the Hongqiao transport hub has two metro lines linking it to the city centre. 
All in all, we were left in no doubt both by relocated villagers that they felt the living environment 
in Aibo Community was superior to that which had been left behind. 
 
Despite all the new facilities in Aibo, an overwhelming majority of relocatees (94%) told us that 
they had lost out through the process of resettlement as they had been deprived of the good 
standard of living they derived from rents and land dividends. When asked what the biggest 
change was after their relocation, over half gave reduced income as an answer. Indeed, most 
interviewees told us their incomes had fallen to from 10,000 to 20,000 RMB after relocation, 
down from an annual average of 40,000 to 50,000 RMB beforehand. Interviewees tended to 
respond that they could live without advanced facilities but not without jobs and rental income. 
When comparing their lives before and after relocation,  former villagers maintained that they 
were more concerned about their income and job opportunities as sources of livelihood rather 
than about improving the living environment. When asked what the biggest change brought 
about by resettlement was, 56% answered reduced income while the most common positive 
answer was convenient transportation, followed by improvement in living environment.  
 
                                                 
13
 Interview with project officials, 10 January 2012. 
14
 Interviews with a project official and a tenant, 28 September 2015. 
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-- Table about here ± 
 
Relocated villagers were asked to select factors according to whether they were better or 
worse after resettlement. Infrastructure topped the list of improvements (ca. 51%), followed 
closely by welfare, environment for daily life and education (Table 3). Even here, however, 
when subsequently interviewed, our survey participants raised some major issues. New 
transport links were of limited use to relocated residents as the metro stations are not within 
walking distance from Aibo Community. Improvements in welfare were limited; the category 
of urban hukou they obtained provided them with a lower level of healthcare and pension 
entitlements than a full urban hukou and represented little change from their previous rural 
hukou; many of them had had jobs in local factories enabling them to access pension and 
health insurance. This was brought home to us in the following comments from a resident 
whom we interviewed: 
 
³7KHODQGDQGKRXVHZHKDYHORVWZHUHWKHVRXUFHRIRXUOLYHOLKRRG$IWHUGHPROLWLRQ
our life has no security. Our rural hukou has changed to an urban hukouEXWZHGRQ¶W
enjoy the same health care and pensions as Shanghai city residents; we are now 
second-class citizens. We are still rural villagers although our hukou and housing has 
DOOFKDQJHG(YHQWKHJRYHUQPHQWVHHVXVDVUXUDOYLOODJHUV´15 
 
The inadequacy of compensation was the major negative factor, mentioned by just over half 
the respondents, followed by income and job opportunities, findings that were confirmed in 
our interviews. In the words of one resettled resident: 
 
³:H DUH WUHDWHG DV SUREOHPV WR EH GHDOW ZLWK UDWKHU WKDQ >UHVLGHQWV@ WREH VHUYHG
Particularly in terms of the compensation standard, for demolition in the city centre -- 
a small apartment in the city centre -- you can get a lot of money. People even count 
the number of bricks [in the demolished home] to raise the compensation. Our big 
houses jusWJRWXVYHU\OLWWOHFRPSHQVDWLRQ:HDUHYHU\DQJU\´16 
 
Due to low skill levels, lack of qualifications and lack of re-training programmes, resettled 
residents found there were not enough suitable job opportunities for them. By 2012, only 1000 
job opportunities had been created in the whole of Xinhong Township, in which Aibo 
Community is located. In particular, younger relocatees had difficulty finding a job. Despite the 
inauguration of the Hongqiao transport hub, more and more young people moved towards the 
city centre to look for job opportunities.17 Among the few jobs available were as security staff 
in the Hongqiao Business District. By October 2015, with the core area of Hongqiao Business 
District partially complete, some 300 vacancies for security guards and cleaners had been 
filled, primarily by resettled residents. The Hongqiao Business District authorities had 
encouraged companies to recruit the relocated villagers and promised to provide more of this 
kind of job, but for the companies themselves recruitment of migrants with rural hukou was 
certainly a cheaper option. The villagers themselves, however, were reluctant to accept jobs 
of this nature.18 Officials, on the other hand, claimed in interviews that some resettled families 
                                                 
15
 Interview with relocated villager, 29 July 2015.  
16
 Interview with relocated villager, 25 August 2015.  
17
 Interviews with relocated villagers, 12 July 2012. 
18
 Interviews with a project official and relocated villagers, 2 October 2015. 
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had unrealistic expectations of the possible rewards from their compensation, believing they 
could use their compensation funding to buy a new car, and local officials blamed resettled 
villagers for being reluctant to take on manual labour, claiming that some of them had even 
become addicted to gambling.19  
 
The message that came across from our interviews and survey was a clear one, even if it was 
sometimes contradicted by comments from officials. When comparing their lives before and 
after resettlement, residents maintained that they were more concerned about their income 
and job opportunities as sources of livelihood rather than about the improved living 
environment. They could cope without advanced facilities, but not without jobs and rental 
income. There was a significant level of dissatisfaction with their compensation and an 
overwhelming feeling of having lost out.  
 
 
&RQFOXGLQJWKRXJKWVµUHQW-ORVW¶IDUPHUVLQQHZYLOODJHV-in-the-city 
 
The displacement and resettlement that we have examined here occurred in an area that had 
been on the periphery of Shanghai. Although Shanghai had spread well beyond Hongqiao, it 
remained a mixed agricultural-industrial area in which farming families retained enough fields 
to provide a small income and supplemented this by building non-registered additions to their 
housing to accommodate migrant workers. Unlike what often occurs in the Pearl River Delta, 
residents were dispossessed of their means of earning a living and resettled in new apartment 
blocks not far from their demolished villages. Only rather perfunctory provision was made for 
their future livelihoods. In this sense, our research has drawn attention to the inadequacy of 
the measures taken by the state to create appropriate circumstances that would allow 
relocatees to establish a new livelihood. 
 
Our interview and survey results have highlighted the nature and extent of concern that local 
residents evinced. While they appreciated the convenience of their new surroundings, these 
sentiments paled in comparison with their dissatisfaction over compensation and concern 
about their future livelihoods. Our findings are reasonably clear-cut. They stand at odds with 
those of Tian et al. (2017), but this can perhaps be explained by different housing histories; 
the former villagers we researched had been able to extend their houses and supplement their 
incomes unlike those surveyed by Tian and colleagues. They are less ambivalent than the 
findings from surveys undertaken by Wu (2004) and Li and Song (2009), even if the 
background circumstances and survey premises differ to some extent. They do, however, 
concur with the findings of Chen (2003) and Mao and Wang (2006) in so far as they too paint 
a negative picture of the consequences of the displacement and resettlement process for land-
lost farmers. Finally, they support at least partially those of Wilmsen and Wang (2015), who, 
although writing in the different context of large-scale resettlement programmes, argue that 
success is predicated on long-term government commitment, which frequently is lacking.  
 
The former villagers have become land-ORVW DQG µUHQW-ORVW¶ IDUPHUV DV D UHVXOW RI WKH
expropriation of their means of securing a livelihood and of anomalies thrown up by the 
particular institutional arrangements that are the dual land and household registration systems 
(Li et al., 2016). This, crucially, is what allowed them to earn a living from renting out un-
                                                 
19
 Interviews with village committee officials, 29 July 2012.  
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registered accommodation space, considered illegal by officialdom, to migrant workers whose 
presence in these village-in-the-city surroundings went unacknowledged by the authorities. It 
posed a serious problem, however, first for local government officials trying to calculate 
compensation standards (how do you compensate for something that officially does not exist?) 
and later for the resettled villagers, who lost a regular and lucrative source of income. For 
these former villagers whose only skills are in farming there is no obvious way to make a living 
once they run out of compensation funds, and this has gradually become a serious social 
problem not only in Shanghai but throughout China (Chen, 2013; Zhang, 2010).  
 
One of the ironies of the fate of those who lost their homes as a result of the construction of 
the Hongqiao hub is that, unlike with many other acts of expropriation, local residents were 
not displaced to distant new dwellings but were resettled nearby. Although they had not moved 
far, all around them had changed dramatically, and they had lost their means of economic 
support with little provided by the authorities to replace it. The accommodation that they rented 
out was supposed to have been replaced by rent from supplementary apartments in their new 
settlement, but Aibo rents were far beyond the means of migrants and well below the status 
of incoming white collar workers. Meanwhile, many younger residents left, even as their 
parents struggled without jobs, income and security. The irony of the situation meant they 
found themselves occupying approximately the same location but in a completely different 
place, surrounded by commercial developments and up-market residential communities that 
left them feeling, in their own words, like second-class citizens in a new village-in-the-city.  
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